Munu

1. CURRICULUM VITAE of MARIO A. BUNGE 

2. Mario Bunge's letter to Chinese friends

3. Mario Bunge's discussion

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1. CURRICULUM VITAE of MARIO A. BUNGE 

1. PERSONAL

Born 21 September 1919 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Canadian citizen since 1975.

Physics student, Universidad  Nacional de la Plata, 1938-44.

Doctor of physico-mathematical sciences, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1952.

Married to Prof. Marta C. Bunge, Prof. Emerita. of Mathematics, McGill University.

Two children from first marriage (Carlos F. and Mario A. J.) and two from present marriage (Eric R. and Silvia A.)

2. FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Postdoctoral fellow, Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas, São Paulo, Brazil, 1953.

Postdoctoral fellow, Fundación Ernesto Santamarina, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1954.

Research fellow, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Freiburg i. Br., 1965-66.

Killam fellow, 1969-70.

Fellow, John Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 1972-73.

Award of merit, University of Wisconsin, 1979.

Doctor of laws honoris causa, Simon Fraser University, 1981.

Guest of honor, symposium "Ciencia y filosofía en la obra de Mario Bunge", Peñíscola (Spain), 1981.

Príncipe de Asturias prize for the Humanities and Communication, 1982.

Honorary professor, Universidad Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Santo Domingo, 1984.

Fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1984-.

Humanist Laureate, Academy of Humanism, 1985.

Fellow, Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal,1984-.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, 1985.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1987.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 1991.

Honorary Professor, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1991.

Fellow, Royal Society of Canada, 1992.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1995.

Honorary Professor, Universidad de Lima, 1996.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Cayetano Heredia, Lima, 1996.

Laureate Researcher, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología del Perú, 1996.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Lima, 1996.

Distinción de Primer Grado del Libertador Simón Bolívar, Trujillo, Perú, 1996.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Argentina, 1996.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa, Perú, 1997.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad de Palermo, Argentina, 1998.

Honorary professor, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, 1998.

Pioneer, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 2000.

Honorary member, Sociedad Científica Argentina, 2000.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, 2001.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, 2001.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Mendoza, 2001.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad de Ciencias Empresariales y Sociales, Buenos Aires, 2001.

Corresponding member, Academia Nacional de Ciencias, Argentina, 2001.

Guest of honor, symposium Aletheia Group, Vigo, Spain, 2003.

Doctor honoris causa, Universidad de Salamanca, 2003.

3. POSITIONS HELD

Founder and Honorary Secretary, later Headmaster, Universidad Obrera Argentina, 1938-43.

Teaching assistant, Experimental Physics, Universidad de la Plata, 1941.

Secretary general, Federación Argentina de Sociedades Populares de Educación, 1942-43.

Teaching assistant, mathematical physics, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1947-52, in charge of special courses (Laplace transforms, Deltas, Antennas, and Wave Guides).

Subdirector, Biophysics Laboratory, Dirección de Medicina Tecnológica, Ministerio de Salud Pública de la Nación, Buenos Aires, 1949.

Visiting Lecturer, Inter American Course on Modern Physics, organized by UNESCO, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz, Bolivia, 1955.

Visiting Lecturer, Physics Department and Instituto Pedagógico, Universidad de Chile, 1955.

Editor, Asociación Física Argentina, 1956-63.

Assistant Professor of Theoretical Physics, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1956.

Assistant Professor of Theoretical Physics, Universidad de La Plata, 1956.

Professor of Theoretical Physics, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1956-58.

Professor of Theoretical Physics, Universidad de la Plata, 1956-59.

Professor of Philosophy, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1957-62.

Councillor, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1958.

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 1960-61.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay, 1962.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad Central, Quito, Ecuador, 1962.

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, Spring, 1963.

Visiting Professor of Physics and Philosophy, Temple University, 1963-64.

Distinguished Visiting Professor of Physics and Philosophy, University of Delaware, 1964-65.

Visiting Professor of Physics, Universität Freiburg, Summer semester, 1966.

Professor of Philosophy, McGill University, 1966-81.

Investigador especial, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Summer, 1969.

Head, Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit, McGill University, 1969-2000.

Honorary Research Professor, Aarhus Universitet, Fall, 1972.

Visiting Professor, ETH Zürich, Spring, 1973,

Research Professor, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1975-76.

UN Development Program consultant, 1979.

Lecturer, Centro de Investigaciones Biológicas, La Paz, B.C.S., México, 1979, 1981, 1982.

National Lecturer, Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 1980-82.

Frothingham Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, McGill University, 1981-.

Visiting Lecturer, Faculté des Sciences, Université de Genève, 1986-87.

Visiting Lecturer, Institut de Psychologie, Université de Fribourg, 1987, 1990.

Visiting Research Professor, Istituto di Economia, Università degli Studi di Genova, 1993-94.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidade Federal de Goiania, Goias, 1995.

Visiting Lecturer, Fundación Simón Rodríguez, Buenos Aires, 1995.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad de Lima, 1996.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Lima, 1996.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad Nacional de Trujillo, Perú, 1996.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad de Salamanca, 1997.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa, Perú, 1997.

Visiting Lecturer, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1999.

Visiting Lecturer, Bernardo Houssay Chair, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1999.

Visiting Professor, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2001.

4. LEARNED SOCIETIES AND JOURNALS

Charter member and later editor, Asociación Física Argentina, 1944-63.

Member, Asociación Argentina para el Progreso de la Ciencia, 1943-63.

Founder and 

Editor, Minerva (Revista Continental de Filosofía), 1944-45.

Member, American Association of Physics Teachers, 1955 -1975.

Charter member, Agrupación Ríoplatense de Lógica y Filosofía Científica, 1956-63. President, 1960-63.

Member, Philosophy of Science Association, USA, 1962-.

Member, Advisory Board, The Monist, 1962-.

Member, Editorial Board, The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1962-67.

Member, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1960-.

Editor and partly translator, Cuadernos de Epistemología  (Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Univ. de Buenos Aires), 1960-63, a collection of 50 booklets.

Member, Association for Symbolic Logic, 1963-78.

Member, Society for Natural Philosophy, 1963-70.

Member, Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, 1965-.

General Editor, Studies in the Foundations, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Springer-Verlag, 1966-71.

Member, British Association for the Philosophy of Science, 1967-.

Member, Canadian Philosophical Association, 1967-.

Assessor, IUHPS, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 1969-71.

Member, Editorial Board, Folia humanistica, 1969-75.

Member, Editorial Board, International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 1969-79.

Member, Institut International de Philosophie, 1969-.

General Editor, Library of Exact Philosophy, Springer-Verlag (Wien), 1969-.

Assessor, Institut International de Philosophie, 1972-75.

Member, Governing Board, Philosophy of Science Association, 1971-73.

Member, National Council, Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science, 1973-76.

Member, Board of Consulting Editors, Theory and Decision, 1972-.

Member, Editorial Board, Theory and Decision Library, 1973-.

Associate Member, American Sociological Association, 1974-.

Member, Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Mathematics, 1974-79.

Assessor, Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, 1974-76.

Member, Editorial Board, Teorema, 1974-.

General Editor, Episteme library, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1974-

Member, Canadian National Committee for the International Union for the History and Philosophy of Science, 1975-76.

Member, Editorial Board, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 1975-78.

Charter member, Society for Exact Philosophy, 1971-. Vice President, 1974-76.

Charter member and first President, Asociación Mexicana de Epistemología, 1976-.

Member, International Editorial Board, Applied Mathematical Modelling, 1977-85.

Member, Advisory Editorial Board, Epistemología, 1978-.

Member, Editorial Board, Technology in Society, 1979-.

Member, Scientific Council, World Future Studies Federation, 19 78-.

Editor, Foundations and Philosophy of Science and Technology series, Pergamon, 1979-.

Member, Advisory Board, Asociación Venezolana de Epistemología, 1979-.

Honorary member, Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, 1980-.

Associate Editor, General Systems, 1981-83.

Member, Editorial Board, Topoi, 1982-.

Member, Comité directeur, Fédération Internationale de Sociétés de Philosophie,1983-1998.

Fellow, Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, 1983-.

Member, Editorial Board, Theoria, 1984-1995.

Member, Editorial Board, Arbor, 1985-97.

Member, Editorial Board, Revista Iberoamericana de Autogestión y Acción Comunal, 1985-.

Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Systems Research, 1985-89.

Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1986-89.

Honorary President, Asociación Platense de Epistemología, 1986-.

Honorary Member, Asociación Panameña para el Avance de la Ciencia, 1986-.

Member, Editorial Board, Systémique (1987- )

Member,  International Advisory Board, Praxiology , 1990-

Assessor, Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, 1990-92

Member, International Advisory Board, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía , 1992-

Vice President, Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, 1993-96.

Member, New York Academy of Sciences, 1993-  .

Member, Comité sur les orientations stratégiques du Fonds FCAR, 1995-97

Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Science Philosophy  Interface ,1996-

General Editor, Science and Technology Studies, Transaction Publishers, 1998-

5. WHO'S WHO'S 

Canadian Who's Who

Directory of American Scholars, Vol. 4 

Directory of American Philosophers 

Who's Who in the East 

Contemporary Authors

American Men and Women of Science

Who's Who in America

Who's Who in Writers, Editors & Poets

6. ENCYCLOPEDIAS AND DICTIONARIES

Diccionario de filosofía (J. M. Ferrater-Mora)

Diccionario de filosofía contemporánea (M. A. Quintanilla, ed.) 

Enciclopedia Garzanti di Filosofia.

Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, III: Les oeuvres philosophiques, tome 2

Enzyklopedie der Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie 

Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET

Petit Larousse Illustré

7. BOOKS ABOUT MARIO BUNGE

J. Agassi & R. S. Cohen, Eds., Scientific Philosophy Today: Essays in Honor of Mario Bunge. Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel, 1982. x+513 pp.

R. Serroni-Copello, Encuentros con Mario Bunge. Buenos Aires: Asociación Argentina de Investigaciones Psicológicas, 1989. 213 pp.

P. Weingartner & G. J. W. Dorn, Eds., Studies on Mario Bunge's Treatise. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1990. 720 pp.

L.-M. Vacher, Entretiens avec Mario Bunge.  Montréal: Liber, 1993. 141 pp.

G. M. Denegri and G. E. Martínez, eds., Tópicos actuales en filosofía de la ciencia: Homenaje a Mario Bunge. Mar del Plata: Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, 2000.

Grupo Aletheia, Congreso-Homenaxe Internacional a Mario Bunge. Vigo, 200

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2. MESSAGE TO MY CHINESE FRIENDS    

Mario Bunge

marucho.bunge@gmail.com

Department of Philosophy

McGill Univesity

Montreal, Canada

The classical essay used to start with a quotation from a supposed sage. In science and technology we have experts but not sages. And our experts say that in the beginning of any scientific or technological project was a problem, such as the epistemological question “What is that?” or the methodological one “How can we get to know something about that?”

通常，经典文章往往是从引用一个假定的智者的观点开始的。在科学技术方面，我们只有专家，而没有智者。我们的专家说，在任何科学或技术项目的起点处都是某一个问题。例如“那是什么？”这样的认识论问题；或者“我们怎样去获得关于那个的某些知识？”这样的方法论问题。

However, problems do not come in a vacuum. Indeed, every problem comes together with some presuppositions, or tacit assumptions, such as Ex nihilo nihil (Nothing comes out of nothing), and “Mathematics is topic-neutral, that is, independent of matters of fact.” 

然而，问题并不凭空生出来。实际上，每一个问题都与某些预设或隐性假定一同出现。例如，无中不能生有（即没有什么能从虚无中产生）；“数学是主题中立的，即，与事实无关。”

The ultimate presuppositions of scientific and technological projects are philosophical, that is, logical, semiotic, metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical. The logical presupposition is that every proposition has a definite logical structure, which is revealed by logical analysis; the semantic presupposition, that every proposition has a definite referent and a definite content; the epistemological presupposition, that every well-posed problem is soluble; and the ethical presupposition, that the ultimate goal of every research project is to find new truths or new artifacts.

科学技术项目的终极预设是哲学的，即逻辑的、符号的、形而上的、认识论的或伦理的。逻辑预设是指：每一个命题都有一个确定的逻辑结构，该逻辑结构可以通过逻辑分析而显现；语义预设：每一个命题都有一个确定的所指和一个确定的内容；认识论预设：每一个恰当提出的问题都是可解的；以及伦理预设：每一个研究项目的终极目标都是发现新的真理或者建构新的人工物。

None of the above is obvious. For example, the typical existentialist formulas are illogical, have no truth and no utility value, hence they do no invite empirical corroboration; and they are not related to well-tried ontological formulas such as “Everything flows”; and they are not testable, hence they are not necessarily true or useful. This is why science students are not required to read Heidegger, none of whose works deals with philosophical problems. 

以上所言并不是显而易见的。例如，典型的存在主义公式是非逻辑的，没有真值，也没有实用价值，因而它们并不需要经验确证；并且它们与久经考验的本体论公式（例如“一切皆变”）并不相关；并且它们也不可检验，因此它们并不必然为真或有用。这就是科学学人为何不必读海德格尔的著作，他的作品无一解决了哲学问题。

In conclusion, philosophical research consists in wrestling with philosophical problems, not in repeating slogans or in commenting about them. No problems, neither science nor technology, nor philosophy. Therefore, to evaluate a text in any of these fields, let us start by asking what problems it intends to attack. In any of those fields, in the beginning is a problem. In the end too: a discourse that does not pose fresh problems is not worthwhile. The same holds for texts so absurd, that they discourage any efforts to think seriously, as is the case with Heidegger’s “Time is the ripening of temporality.” 

总之，哲学研究由力求解决哲学问题所组成，而不是由重复口号或对这些口号评论而组成。没有了问题，便没有了科学，也没有技术，更没有哲学。因此，要对此类领域中的某篇文献进行评估时，我们首先得搞清楚它想要攻克什么问题。在任何此类领域中，起点处都是某个问题。终点处亦如此：没有引发新问题的论说便没有价值。以上的立场也适用于评估如下的这种文章，它们是如此荒谬，以至于抵制任何严肃思考的努力，海德格尔的“时间是时间性的成熟化”就属此类。

Serious cognitive problems can be grouped in various ways. One of them is this: forward (or from premises to conclusions, or from causes to effects) and backward or inverse (from conclusions to premises, or from effects to causes). Most problems in science and technology are inverse. Think of inventing a gadget from the function it is expected to accomplish; of imagining the trajectory of a trip between two given points; of ordering merchandises subject to a budget; of diagnosing a disease from its symptoms; of inferring interactions from orbits; of figuring a crystal structure from its diffraction figure; of discovering atomic or nuclear forces from scatterings; of reconstructing a biological or historical descent line from present data; of designing sanitary facilities fit to a sanitary policy; of calculating the monthly payments that will produce a desired pension; of conjecturing the abilities likely to secure a desired job; and so on.

严肃的认知问题可用各种不同的方式来归类。其中之一就是：正向的（或从前提到结论，或从原因到后果）和反向的或逆向的（从结论到前提，或从后果到原因）。科学技术中的绝大多数问题都是逆向的。试想，从其预期完成的功能来发明一个小装置；想象两个给定点之间的旅行轨迹；根据预算来订购商品；从症状来诊断疾病；从轨道来推断相互作用；从其衍射图样来推出晶体结构；从散射来发现原子力或核力；根据现有数据来重构生物或历史族系线；设计符合卫生政策的卫生设施；计算能获得预期养老金的每月付款；推测有可能确保一份理想工作所需的能力；等等。

Even performing mathematical proofs consists in attacking inverse problems, given that they begin by stating the result to be attained. Hence the usual account of mathematical demonstration, which starts from assumptions, definitions and rules, involves the silent transformation of an inverse into a forward problem.

即使是进行数学证明也由攻克逆向问题所组成，因为数学证明都起始于说明要获得的结果。因此，起始于假设、定义和规则的对数学证明的通常说明，引入了一个将逆向问题向正向问题的无声转换。

How does one tackle inverse problems? The only known way is: by trial and error. In particular, one tries to solve the corresponding forward problem, and checks the solution candidates, to see whether any of them fulfills the conditions laid down in the problem statement. There are no algorithms to handle inverse problems. This suffices to confute Wittgenstein’s thesis, that mathematical work comes down to following rules – as if mathematical rules fell from heaven. Of course, some mathematicians design programs, but only as aids to handle some forward problems – which, as we saw above, are actually inverse problems in disguise. 

人们如何处理逆向问题？唯一公认的方法就是：试错法。具体而言，人们尝试解决其对应的正向问题，并且检验那些候选的解决方案，查看它们是否满足问题陈述中所规定的那些条件。没有什么运算法则来处理逆向问题。这便足以驳倒维特根斯坦的如下观点：数学工作归结为遵循规则——似乎数学规则从天而降一样。当然，某些数学家设计程序，但仅是作为处理某些正向问题的辅助而已——正如我们上面所看到的，这些问题实际上都是伪装的逆向问题。

In conclusion, to work in science or technology is to wrestle with some problems. Now, for better or for worse, most problems are inverse. But there are no rules for handling inverse problems, except for this one: trial and error. But of course this is just an invitation to exert one’s imagination. So, in the end the dicta of sages will help us solve ordinary problems. But since most problems are inverse, only a lot of sweating will help. In other words, original problems and original solutions to old problems call for some sweating. So, if you wish to remain dry and safe, avoid originality.

总之，工作于科学或技术领域就是要力求解决某些问题。目前，不管是好是坏，绝大多数问题都是逆向的。但是，除了这个试错法之外，要处理反向问题并没有其他规则。当然，这只是对人们发挥其想象力的邀请。所以，最终圣人的格言将帮助我们解决普通问题。但既然大多数问题都是逆向的，只有大量的汗水才会有所帮助。换言之，原创性问题和对旧问题的原创性解法都需要一些汗水。所以，如果你想要保持干爽和安全，避开创新吧。

（2019年8月21日，邦格发出；8月25日，李宗荣初译；26日，沈健、朱诗勇、叶金州修改。）

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3. Mario Bunge's discussion

SYSTEMIC MATERIALISM

Mario Bunge

Marucho.Bunge@gmail.com

Department of Philosophy

McMARIO BUNGE

For Gustavo E. Romero, ed. Materialism Today

Submitted 2018.XY.UV

1. SYSTEMIC MATERIALISM

Systemic materialism is the family of ontologies or metaphysics that hold that the universe is the system of all material things. Its key concepts are defined as follows.

(a)An object is material only if it is changeable (Plato).

(b)A system is a complex object whose parts are held together by binding relations. 

(c)The binding or cohesive relations are explicit or ostensive, such as the attractive forces, or else tacit or stealth, such as a common origin and quantum entanglement over long distances.

(d)An emergent thing is one that does not occur on the preceding levels in the levels sticase.   

     Let us clarify the preceding by listing objects that are either nonsystemic or immaterial. Nonsystemic objects: quanta or elementary particles, shipwrecks, garbage mounds, the people who attend a public concert without a previous agreement. Immaterial objects: infinite sets, equations, biospecies (unlike biopopulations), relations without relata, and universals such as love and justice. 

     How do we know that something is a system rather than a collection? We can find out by tampering with one of the system’s relata. And how do we know that something is material rather than ideal? By subjecting it to some stimulus. Note the difference between a metaphysical statement, such as “This is a system”, and an epistemological one, such as “We have checked that this is indeed a system and not an aggregate.” 

     The most obvious binding relations are the attractive forces, such as the gravitational and the nuclear ones. The subtlest of all the tacit relations are those of common origin, entanglement among the fragments of a split, and “the inexorable conventions that tie things together and bound people down to the old pattern” (Edith Wharton 1920).

     The explicit forces are representable by potentials that can be included in lagrangians or hamiltonians, whereas the tacit or stealth connections cannot be so represented. In particular, quantum entanglement is so subtle that Schrödinger discovered it as recently as in 1935, and it is still the object of heated controversies (Schlosshauer 2011).

    Systems can be broken down or analyzed, and some of them can be put back together. But, as Humpty Dumpty found out, not all sytems can be reconstituted from their components. Analyses pose forward problems, while syntheses pose inverse problems. There are algorithms for tackling some forward problems, but not for solving inverse ones.

     Theories, in particular axiomatically organized theories, are the conceptual counterparts of material systems. Euclid may have been the first to notice the advantages of “organic” wholes over eclectic collections. But the earliest general treatment of systems of all kinds, namely systematology, was proposed by the polymath Johann Heinrich Lambert (1988), a protégé of Friedrich der Grosse and friend of Euler and Kant. He tried but failed to build a phenomenology because phenomena, or appearances, are subject-bound rather than impersonal and universal. Thiry d’Holbach exploited systmatically the system concept in his writings about nature and society. The founder of ecology, Alexander von Humbold, coined the concept of ecosystem and the view of nature as the system of all natural systems.

    Very few philosophers noticed that the very concept of a material system is modern, and that it should have transformed ontology. Nelson Goodman (1951) understood the superiority of systems over magpies’ collections, but he sought them where there are none, namely among appearances.

      Most contemporary philosophers prefer the term supervenience, whereas scientists tend to use emergence. The earliest, most explicit and complete philosophical work on material systems was that of Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach. His works Système de la nature (1770) and Système social (1773) were both novel and influential, except perhaps in the UK, where the timid Scottish Enlightenment outshone the audacious French Enlightenment, and where individualism was and still is the dominant ontology.

    Remember Margaret Thatcher’s famous sentence: “There is no such thing as society. There are only individuals.” Everyone else knows that marrid couples schools, business concerns and governments are supraindividual things with global properties, such as complexity, stability (or instability), and quantum entanglement. And most people also know that systems tend to outlive their components.

    Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s (1950) paper on systems drew the attention of many scientists to the concept of a system. His main examples of a system were the systems of algebraic and differential equations. That paper inspired the general systems movement, which was eventually kidnapped by amateurs who mistook systemism for holism, and claimed to be able to understand systems of all kinds without conducting any empirical investigations (Wang 2011). Actually general systems theory is not a theory but a viewpoint or approach (Rapoport 1976).   

    The earliest victories of the systemic approach occurred in the foundation of mathematics. For instance, Peano’s definition of whole numbers is a set of five postulates. Since most mathematicians and factual science continued to work on isolated problems, the great  Hilbert (1917) devoted a whole paper to the virtues of axiomatics. He also axiomatized the classical theory of radiation, but it was published shortly after it was shown to be at variance with experiment, so that physicists paid no attention to it.

    The earliest thoughts about material systems may have been those of the astronomers who wondered whether the celestial constellations, such as Cassiopeia, were systems or just coincidences perceived differently by different observers. The first theoretical work on astronomic systems is likely to have been Ptolemy’s, even though he believed that all scientific work is about appearances – which was indeed the case with ancient planetary astronomy. 

    Incidentally, the models or conceptual representations of these configurations were called systems even as late as the early 20th century, when Pierre Duhem’s vast Systems of the World appeared. This title may have been inspired by Galileo’s famous dialogue on the geocentric and heliocentric models of the solar system. The systematic use of the ontological concept of a material system  emerged one century later, along with Newton’s physics. 

     The concept of a material system was taken for granted in physics before it came to the front thanks to the experiments on entanglement (e.g. Zeilinger 2010). Chemical systems were discussed together with chemical reactors and the interactions between reactions in a reactor. The anatomists who introduced the concepts of anatomic system (like the cardiovascular and nervous ones) and systemic disorder shifted interest from organ to organ system. Alexander von Humboldt brought systems to the fore when introducing the concept of an ecological system (Wulf 2015). And the neuropsychologist Donald Hebb (1949) struck gold when he introduced the concept of cell assembly, which was followed by the present author’s psychon (Bunge 1980), or the smallest neuron assembly capable of fulfilling mental functions such as perceiving and ideating.

    The most important changes that the systemic perspective inspired was those that it prompted in the social studies, where it offered an alternative to the traditional disjunction individualism/holism represented by classical and neoclasssical microeconomics and macroeconomics respectively. Indeed, in his Tableau économiqe (1759) François Quesnay introduced the systemic concept of a national economy, which John Maynard Keynes (1936) developed nearly two centuries later. The systemic ontology behind the work of both Quesnay and Keynes is at variance with the individualism inherent in both the neoclassical and the Austrian schools since Adam Smith’s splendid Inquiry (1776). The central thesis of social systemics is of course the assumption that all social transactions, from marriage to trade and management, occur within or between social systems – which individualists declare fictive while holists deem to be unanalyzable.    

    The systemic approach is intimately related to the axiomatic organization of theories, since a theory is a hypothetico-deductive system, or a collection of formulas closed under deduction. The earliest work in physical axiomatics was the present author’s (Bunge 1967a, 1967b, 1967c.). This style was called dual axiomatics because every mathematical axiom was paired to a postulate sketching the physical meaning of the concept in question. For example, the elusive concept of a state function may be elucidated as follows:  is a vector in the quanton’s Hilbert space, such that its square multiplied by the volume element v equals the probability of the quanton’s presence in v (Born’s postulate).

     Systemism is often mistaken for holism, or the doctrine of the metaphysical and epistemological primacy of the whole over its parts. Holism is logically wrong because the concepts of part and whole define each other; it is epistemologically wrong because it attempts to minimize or even eliminate analysis; and (c) it is ethically wrong because it favors the subordination of the individual to the totality instead of favoring the mutual accommodation of person and social group.   

      Let us now list and sketch the main kinds of materialism invent ed since antiquity, when Democritus and Epicurus formulated the physicalist research project.

     1.Physicalism = nominalism = vulgar materialism = mechanical materialism = reductive materialism All existents are material and have only physical properties.

       2.Nominalism = concepts and propositions are so many flati voces, and they should be replaced with linguistic terms and sentences respectively – whence the ugly ‘sentential calculus’ for the propositional calculus. The most influential of the contemporary nominalists were the famous logicians Alfred Tarski and Willard Van Orman Quine. But their work remained confined to the philosophies of logic and mathematics – the only academic fields where materialism has nothing to say.   

      3.Australian materialism, particularly the “central state” philosophy of mind of Jack Smart, David Armstrong and Ullian T. Place, was the only philosophical school that dared call itself materialist in the midst of the Cold War. Australian materialism did not develop further because it made no connection with the cognitive neuroscience that arose at about the same time. In Armstrong’s latest ontology, the concept of matter has been replaced with that of a state, as though there could be states other than material things in different states.

      4.Emergentist materialism = All existents are material, and some of them have emerged in the course of evolution. The concept of emergence arose in connection with Darwinism, and was first defined by George H. Lewes (1875). The present author (Bunge 2003) has proposed two mutually complementary definitions: Emergent property 1 = Property of a whole that none of its parts possesses. Emergent property 2 = Property of the members of a biological or historical staircase that do no occur on any of the preceding levels.

     5. Dialectical materialism = All existents are material, and every one of them is a unity of opposites. I submit that, when in power dialectical materialists have hampered the advancement of science because of their reliance on Hegel’s absurd ontology, as well as on the  authority of a political party. Although the European Marxists claimed that dialectical materialism is the philosohy of science, the fact is that the Soviet dialectical materialists used their political power to attack all the scientific novelties that emerged during their time, from mathematical logic to the quantum theory and genetics. Still, dialectical materialists have paid lip service to both materialism and realism. Hence they should be helped to correct their errors rather than rejected out of hand.

      6. Historical materialism = Every society is divided into a material infrastructure and a spiritual superstructure. Futher, the infrastructure determines the superstructure, in the same sense as Primum vivere,

deinde philosophari. Moreover, all the social facts fit historical laws, and human history is the history of class conflicts. Here, Material = belonging to the economic level. Although historical materialism is inferior to the total history of the Annales school, it is superir to the idealist schools according to which history is the deployment of ideas. 

       7. Systemic materialism: The universe and all its inmates are systems of material objects, where System = complex object whose components are held together by cohesive or binding relations, and material = changeable. I submit that systemic materialism is the ontology most favorable to the advancement of science because (a) modern science has shown that, in fact, there are neither immaterial nor isolated things, and (b) because the accompanying ethics favors both individual aspirations and collective harmony. 

     Systemic materialism may be compressed into the following theses:

1.All real existents are material and conversely.

2.Every real existent except for the universe is either a system or a part of one. 

     3 The universe is a material system. Immaterial and isolated entities, from mathematical systems to deities, have been imagined by highly developed animals, and none of them exists outside human brains. However, belief in the ghostly may influence behavior. 

     4.The universe had no beginning and it will never cease to exist. The Big Bang was a cosmic explosion, but there is no explosion without explosives. We do not know what preceded the Big Bang, nor whether it occurred everywhere or only in our corner of the universe.

There is no evidence for the identification of the Big Bang with the origin of things. But every conservation law is an argument against

that identification.  Scientific cosmology is megaphysics. The creationist cosmologies are just as mythical as biological creationism. 

     5. The states and changes of state of all real existents are lawful, and laws are causal or stochastic. Laws, or objective patterns, are not to be confused with law statements, or conceptualizations of laws. Far from being mutually isolated, the law statements combine into webs: every one of the variables occurring in one general law statement occurs also in at least another one. This explains why, in addition to interlevel sciences like physics and biology, we also have interlevel sciences like biophysics. Nothing can be altered unless it complies with the pertinent laws. The deepest and most lasting changes in a system are the ones brought about by altering the system’s mechanism, that is, the processes that makes it tick.

    6. The totality of things can be split into physical, chemical, 

biological, and social levels or kinds. There is no spiritual level because everything spiritual is cerebral. Ideas in themselves are certainly conceivable but they do not constitute a world or system, and their collection is not self-existent: the earliest idea was thought by an early humans, and the last one will be thought by the last human brain. 

     7. The levels of organization are ordered by the emergence relation: Physical < Chemical < Biological < Cultural < Political < Social. This sequence is often called a hierarchy – a misnomer because the levels staircase is not sacred and it involves complexity and succession but not superiority. All the levels above the bottom one are characterized by emergent properties. Physicalism accounts for the bottom level but fails for the rest, while spiritualism fails for all levels.

       8. All the evolutionary processes have consisted of spontaneous

changes followed by random selection, and in recent eras also by design and planning. 

    9. All the artifacts have been designed, implemented, improved and run by highly developed organisms. There are self-organizing

material systems, but artifacts are not among them.

     10. From their beginning, humans have been self-made and therefore rather artificial – whence the fallacy of naturalism in social studies.

     11. Since all artifacts are preceded by designs, no artifact exists by itself, so that the prophecies about the future rule of autonomous machines are groundless.

    12. There are no perfect artifacts, in particular perfect social regimes, and there have always been individuals and groups intent on improving regimes, but they have not always succeeded.  

      13. In the course of their evolution, humans have invented and implemented social systems of several kinds, from bands and families to economic, political, and cultural systems of different kinds.

    14. The main sources of social change are imitation, cooperation, competition, dispersion, and invention. Whereas cooperation promotes the formation or reinforcement of systems, competition often leads to the weakening of social ties and eventually the breakdown of some systems.

    15. Power inequalities generate political struggles, some of which end up in more egalitarian societies while others intensify power inequalities.

    16. Human beings are the only animals who invented wars capable of annihilating their own species, and even to extinguish all life on Earth.

    17. A thoroughly material world, one without inscrutable and indomitable free spirits such as angels, devils and freely roaming ghosts, is surely amenable to research and control, and thus in agreement with a realistic epistemology. 

    18. Systemic materialism and realism are jointly the foundations of a realist and humanist axiology and ethics centered in the socially responsible individual and facing real issues such as those raised by militarism, poverty and oppression rather than artificial problems like controlling an unmanned trolley rushing down a forked rail.

      19. Work on the synthesis of living matter has advanced to the point that, barring nuclear wars, the colonization of other planets is  becoming possible. It is also possible that other intelligent animals live elsewhere and get in touch with us. If this came to pass, terrestrians would need to prevent bellicose groups from provoking extraterrestrians.

     20. Given the quick pace of both astrobiology and technology, the nefarious star wars are becoming really possible. Such a nightmarish prospect suggests that deweaponing outer space and cosmic peace are universal desiderata. These goals may be attained through replacing individual and Earth-bound gain by solidarity and environmental protection on a cosmic scale. systemic materialism helps these causes by suggesting that salvation may come through working on real systems rather than through thinking of fictions such as eternal life, passive compassion, detachment from worldly concerns, or the free and self-repairing market. Materialists of all flavors prefer the materialities of the real here and now to fictitious futures.

      In closing, let us admit the defects of systemic materialism: it is neither for the faint-hearted nor for the data collectors. On the other hand, consider the advantages of a world of material, interdependent, scrutable and controllable systems over a universe of either strays or random collections: addition of resources, unity with variety, possible symphony, and manageability. 

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